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Lecturer in Law, Department of Law, University of Botswana
INTRODUCTION
It is intended by this paper to explore among other things, the objectives of sentencing, the 
types of sentences, the determination of these types of sentences and what factors to consider 
in sentencing a first offender. Uncertainty is deep seated in the sentencing process.1 As put 
by an American judge, "a large number of persons accused of crimes are often at a loss 
when brought before the courts of the land, whether they would go free, be locked in or 
anything in between." An attempt has been made in this paper to shed some light to those 
who for the first time will find themselves faced with such a problem.
DEFINITION AND OBJECTIVES 
Definition
Sentence arises only when an accused person has been convicted, either on his own plea 
and admission of guilt or on a plea of not guilty. It is the recorded declaration of the Court 
pronouncing the legal consequences of the facts judicially ascertained.2Sentencing however 
is
The post conviction stage of the criminal justice process in which the defendant is 
brought before the court for imposition of sentence.3 4
It is the imposition of criminal penalties for violating the law;1 the end of the process for 
the defendant, the time when the severity of punishment is fixed.5 For the purposes of this 
study, I am persuaded to accede to these definitions.
Objectives
The objectives constitute the aims intended to be achieved when sentencing a first offender. 
Among the earliest aims appears retribution, the more modern being rehabilitation. It is 
hoped that more will evolve with time. Other current aims include incapacitation and 
deterrence. Whilst these objectives may have found their way into the practices of our 
courts, they have not yet gained entry into our statute books as a formal measure.
RETRIBUTION
Retribution stretches as far back as the Biblical times. In those times the principle was that 
it shall be done to him as he has done; a'fracture for a fracture, an eye for an eye, a tooth for
1 David W. Neybauer America's Courts And The Criminal justice System Books/Cole Publishing Co. 
Monterely/California p309.
2 Lester Bernhardt Orfield, Criminal Procedure from Arrest to Appeal, Greenwood. Westport. 1972 p 535.
3 Henry, Campbell, Blacks Law Dictionary, St Paul minn. West Publishing Co, 1979 5th Ed. p 1222, 
p 1223.
4 Gerald D. Robin Introduction to the Criminal justice System: Principles Procedure and Practice, Harper & 
Row, Publishers, New York, 2nd Edition p329.
5 David W. Neubauer, America's Courts and the Criminal justice System Note 1 above.
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a tooth.6 Punishment was made to fit the crime, to appease the victim if he survived, the 
relatives if the victim departed the human scene. The underlying concept was getting even. 
Retribution as it were, a desire for revenge,7 was as put by other writers, an expression of 
social condemnation that reinforced the societal values and norms that the defendant 
transgressed.8
Incapacitation/isolation/restraint
While some books on criminal justice employ the term incapacitation, others are content 
with yet another, isolation. But there is a third which has crept into the vocabulary of social 
scientists, that is restraint. The terminology might be different, but the concept behind is 
similar. It is aptly expressed in the statement; "lock them up and throw away the key".9 As 
a sentencing philosophy the purpose originally was to remove dangerous persons from 
the community.10 1In those times a member of the society who committed a serious crime 
was normally banished from that particular community. This prevailed in African society 
in what has now become known as Central Africa. In those generations people went into 
exile even before they were banished. It was not only a punitive measure but a custom 
designed to cleanse the community, which was believed to have been soiled by the hideous 
act committed. Contemporaneously, Britain sent criminals to places as far as Australia. 
Other countries like the Soviet Union exiled so-called dissidents to desolate and distant 
lands within the Union itself. Through this concept the offender was denied the opportunity 
to put into execution his criminal propensities hence the community was protected. As a 
matter of fact his threat to society at least during the time of his incapacitation was greatly 
reduced or eliminated. Whether a sentencing tribunal could accurately estimate when the 
offender would be a 'good risk” for not recidivating is a moot question. In modern times 
incapacitation has become humane containment in a prison or institution.
Deterrence
This is the threat of actual imposition of punishment.12 It has both a general and specific 
aspect.13 According to this sentencing philosophy, law abiding citizens can be deterred 
from turning into crime. Within this theory is the argument that when criminals are punished 
and a public spectacle is made of them, members of the public would be discouraged from 
committing similar offences. The specific element creeps in when the punishment is aimed 
at a particular individual. At this level, the amount and kind of punishment meted out is 
such as to make the offender not recidivate. In short punishment is made to fit the criminal 
and not the crime.
6 Leviticus Chapter 25 verses 17-22 reproduced in Note 5 above.
7 See note 5 above.
8 See note 4 above.
9 See note 5 above.
10 See note 5 above.
11 See note 4 above.
12 See note 4 above
13 Harold J. Vetter, Leonard Territo Crime and Justice in America A I lurnan Perspective, Western publishing 
Co. St. Paul 1984 Chap. 11. p 338.
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Rehabilitation
This denotes the efforts to change an offender from law-breaker to a law-abider and a 
useful member of the community through treatment.14 It links criminal behaviour with 
abnormality or some form of deficiency in the criminal.15 It proceeds on the assumption 
that human behaviour can be altered. That since it is the product of antecedent causes, 
these would have to be identified and classified for treatment. These antecedent causes 
could be psychological, social, vocational or academic.16 Success is based on the need to 
assess the needs of the individual and the provision of a programme to meet these needs.17 
This theory has been heavily criticized. It has been argued that there is great difficulty in 
identifying first, antecedent causes of criminal behaviour,18 that this philosophy assumes 
the characteristic of a medical model implying that the offender is sick because he cannot 
adjust to society. This, it is further argued, is fallacious. The argument proceeds, offenders 
may well be aware of their actions and completely rational in deciding to engage in criminal 
activity because of its higher personal pay off. In any event, if offenders are to be 
rehabilitated, the assumption is that they must learn to accept the values of those conducting 
the treatment even though backgrounds might differ, perceptions vary and attitudes are 
opposed.
Critique
The writer does not intend to embark on a critique of these sentencing philosophies but 
rather to employ them in shedding some light on how the courts proceed in the execution 
of their daily sentencing duties.
Prison
While rehabilitation assumes a therapeutic cloak, the other theories accept in some measure 
the legitimacy of a prison as a place of punishment. It becomes such a place when one 
adopts the attitude that it is a place from which "men recoil with horror — a place of real 
suffering painful to the memory, terrible to the imagination . . .  a place of sorrow and 
wailing, which should be entered with horror and quitted with earnest resolution never to 
return to such misery".19 It is contended that the courts of our land bear in mind the above 
theories and adopt a somewhat similar though moderate attitude of what prisons are, 
when the criminal justice process has reached the post conviction stage, the stage when the 
defendant would either receive a custodial or a non custodial sentence.
TYPE OF SENTENCE
There are basically two types: a custodial and a non-custodial sentence. A custodial type of 
sentence may arise in circumstances where the offence committed is punishable with 
imprisonment and it is almost certain th&t even if the learned judge were to properly exercise 
his discretion the offender would still be incarcerated. The latter sentence may arise in an
14
15
16
17
18 
19
See note 4 above.
Robert D. Pursley Introduction to Criminal justice , MacMillan, London, 3rd Ed. p 390.
See note 4 above.
See note 4 above.
See note 4 above.
Robert D. Pursley Introduction to Criminal Justice, MacMillan. London. 3rd Ed. p 390.
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instance where the nature of the offence is such that the judge properly directing himself 
will refrain from sending the offender to prison. It should be observed that in all other 
cases other than in murder and treason convictions, the learned judge or magistrate properly 
directing himself will consider whether or not he should avoid sending a first offender to 
prison20 that is consider a non-custodial sentence. Below are some of the non-custodial 
sentences falling for consideration by the learned judge or magistrate.
(i) Non-custodial 
Types
Security for keeping the peace (section 33 (1) Penal Code)
When the tribunal is of the view that it is not necessary to punish the offender by sending 
him to prison, the court may in terms of this section order the accused to enter into a 
recognisance (undertaking) with or without sureties (guarantors) in a specific amount 
determined by it. The amount so determined is not paid at the time but is forfeited when 
the accused is found not to have kept the peace and been of good behaviour for a time 
fixed by the court, a condition of the recognisance, or find sureties as directed, he is liable 
to be committed to prison.
Binding over to come for judgement and Discharge (section 33 (2) Penal Code)
In accordance with this subsection the court may in time of passing sentence, discharge 
the offender but require him to enter into a recognisance in the sum the court may determine, 
with or without guarantors, to come up for judgement at some future sitting or when 
called upon to do so. This in effect is a power to defer sentence. No time limit need be 
specific and the defendant is brought back to court only if he misbehaves.21
Recognisance to keep the peace (section 302 Criminal Procedure and Evidence)
If the conditions upon which any recognisance or security under section 35 of the 
Penal Code22 was given are not observed by the person who gave it, the court may 
declare the recognisance or security to be forfeited and any such declaration or 
forfeiture shall have the effect of a judgement in a civil action in that court.
Discharge without punishment (section 34 Penal Code)
This in essence is similar to the Absolute discharge of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 
1973 of England.23 Section 34 para-phrased provides that when the court is of the opinion 
that the charge has been proved, that having regard to the extenuating circumstances in 
which it was committed or character, age, antecedents, health, mental condition of the 
accused or trivial nature of the offence, that it is inexpedient to inflict any punishment, it 
may, without proceeding to conviction dismiss the charge. This section is used where a 
great deal is to be said by way of mitigation in favour of the accused.24 A discharge under
20 Sir. Rupert Cross, The English Sentencing System, Buttcrworths, London. 1975. p 6, See further Nigel 
Murray, Some Advice to New Magistrates. Notes based on a handout for use with a lecture delivered by 
Nigel Murray to law students at the University of Botswana on 6th March, 1986.
21 Nigel Walker, Sentencing: Theory Law and Practice, Buttcrworths , London. 1985 p 228.
22 This is a misprint. The correct section referred to is section 33 of the Penal Code.
23 See section 7 (i) reproduced in the English Sentencing System, note 20 above p 7.
24 Nigel Walker, Sentencing Theory, Law Practice , Buttcrworths , London. 1985 p 231.
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section 34 should only be used in the exceptional circumstances set out under that section.25 
Absolute discharges are intended for cases in which the judge has a few if any misgivings 
about a repetition of the offence and wishes to do all he can to reduce the stigma attaching 
to the conviction.26
Discharge with caution/reprimand (section 310 Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act)
The provisions of this section may operate in circumstances subsumed under section 34 of 
the Penal Code. It is however not limited to those set out in section 34 of the code. There 
could be no doubt that it is suitable for clear-cut minor offences and at least those offences 
which the tribunal adjuges should not have been brought to court for trial but rather a 
decision not to prosecute have been taken. Juveniles and the infirm can suitably be dealt 
with under this section. The section may operate as the courts 'caution' or 'reprimand' 
where the police could have appropriately cautioned or reprimanded the accused. Murder, 
robbery, rape; and any conspiracy, incitement or attempts to commit these offences are 
excluded. The section also does not apply to offences in which a minimum punishment is 
provided.
The fine
When imposed by the court it is intended to punish the offender. Such punishment arising 
in the form of financial loss. In the event that financial loss is not suffered, loss of liberty in 
consequence thereof becomes inevitable. Fines are quite common, especially in motoring 
offences, and are normally imposed when the tribunal is of the view that the above sentences 
are unsuitable. According to Judge Murray:
Where it is necessary to punish an offender the usual penalty will be a fine.27
When the tribunal has concluded that a fine is appropriate certain considerations arise. 
The maximum fine is rarely ever imposed. The amount of the fine imposed must not exceed 
the defendant's ability to pay. In other words it must not be too excessive. In the State vs 
Molelo Gaseome and Others,28 the learned judge altering the sentence proceeded to say the 
following:
As I said before in previous judgements, the sentencing of an accused to a large fine 
which he has no hope of paying is wrong in principle. A fine should be geared to the 
means of the accused and if he cannot afford to pay a fine another method of 
punishment should be considered even imprisonment if it is warranted.
Gaseome and four others had been convicted on their own pleas of guilty to the offence of 
hunting and killing one gemsbok in the Gemsbok National Park without a permit contrary 
to the Fauna Conservation Act. They had been sentenced by a magistrate to pay a fine of 
P450 (which they were unable to pay) or 18 months imprisonment in default of payment. 
One of them, a boy of 15 years, had been discharged upon entering a recognisance.29 
Ordinarily the court will ascertain the means of the offender before the imposition of the 
fine. But the fine is not normally increased simply because of the amplitude of means of
25 Nigel Murray note 20 above p 26.
26 Sir Rupert Cross note 20 above p 10.
27 Nigel Murray note 20 above p 26.
28 State v. Molelo Gaseome and Others.
29 Note 28 above.
130 Kuousani S olo
the offender.30 The Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act makes provision for the payment 
of fines in instalments within a period not exceeding twelve months.31 The criminal code 
lays down periods of imprisonment in default of payment, the outer maxima being 6 months 
of imprisonment.32
Where a money penalty is imposed an alternative term of imprisonment proportionate to 
it is provided. The majority of cases brought before the courts are dealt with by way of 
fines.
Offenders to be kept out of Prison
It may now have been clear that the measures outlined above are in keeping with the 
general principle that first offenders should be kept out of prison where possible.
In Julia Sakala and Another vs The State,33 the learned judge (HAYFRON-BENJAMIN), 
considering the submission of the Defence Counsel that the appellants should not have 
been sent to prison because they were first offenders, proceeded to say the following:
There are no doubt judicial pronouncements on this score, that first offenders should 
not be sent to prison, if other satisfactory punishments can be imposed. These dicta in 
my humble view state too widely the policy of our courts. The policy of our courts is 
to avoid sending young offenders to prison if possible, and this for the simple reason 
that they arc likely to come out of gaol rather worse characters than when they went 
in, and society would be saddled with them for a long period . . .
Where young offenders are concerned, the judge proceeded, courts take into account the 
seriousness of the offence and the circumstances of the offence and the circumstances under 
which it was committed. On the same score in the State vs. Maborigo,3* Mohamed J; quoting 
a South African decision35 with approval stated:
Sending a first offender to jail should generally be avoided if a non-custodial sentence 
would serve to afford the community adequate protection, depending of course on 
the seriousness of the crime and the circumstances of the particular case . .  .
The locus classicus on the matter is the dictum of Aguda C.J. (as he then was) in an earlier 
case, Visser vs The State36 where he held:
As I said in a recent case I myself am thoroughly convinced of the principle that a first 
offender must as far as possible be kept out of jail but to raise that principle to an 
immutable principle of law will be to do violence to justice in some cases.
Referring to the decision in Visser vs. The State; per Obrien Quinn, C.J.:
That decision of Aguda C.J. still holds good but has been amplified and refined in 
more recent cases as the incidence of crime has increased a great deal in the 10 years 
since 1974.37
The court of appeal has fairly recently ratified the proposition of law discussed above.38
30 Nigel Murray note 20 above p 27.
31 Section 306 Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act Cap.: 08:02 Laws of Botswana.
32 Sections 31 Penal Code Cap. 08:01 Laws of Botswana.
33 Julia Sakala and anotherv. The State High Court Criminal Appeal No. 85/1978 Unreported.
34 State v. Mabongo 1978 BLR 72.
35 State v. Kulati 1975 (1) SA 557 at 560.
36 Visser v. The State 1974 (1) BLR 68.
37 Tshweu Baphutlele v. The State Criminal Appeal No. 186/1984 unreported (Per Obrien Quinn CJ).
38 David Pule v. The State Criminal Appeal No. 27/1984 unreported.
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(ii) Custodial
A custodial sentence may arise in circumstances where a judge properly directing himself 
to the law and facts before him considers that a non-custodial measure is inappropriate 
but decides that passing a term of imprisonment whether suspended partially or to be 
effectively served is appropriate.
Types
Suspended sentence
The purpose and rationale of a suspended sentence was eloquently stated in the celebrated 
English case of R v. O. Keeffe.39 The judicial pronouncement there propounded has been 
cited with approval in our courts. Per Obrien Quinn C.J.40:
It has been laid down in R.v O'Keefle that before passing a suspended sentence the 
court must go through the process of eliminating other possible courses, and only 
when, having considered the alternatives, it decides that the case in question is one 
for imprisonment should the option of a suspended sentence be considered. The 
passing of a suspended sentence is not, primarily an exercise in leniency but is the 
passing of the most suitable sentence possible having taken into consideration every 
aspect of the matter and after coming to the conclusion that a custodial sentence would 
be the most appropriate sentence . .  .
It has been submitted by other writers, quite rightly in my view, that if a prison sentence in 
a matter is quite inevitable by reason of the circumstance that the offence requires a deterrent 
or discriminatory sentence, then taking into consideration the circumstances under which 
it was committed and those of the offender, total suspension is justifiable. The fact of the 
suspension is not to be mistaken for a let off. Moreover, the total suspension of the sentence 
does not justify an increase in the length of the term of imprisonment.41 Where the offender 
profited from the offence it would appear that a fine is called for in addition to the sentence. 
Where no financial loss is suffered it is submitted that to tag a fine to the custodial measure 
albeit suspended would be to punish the offender twice.42
Partial Suspensions
As per Hayfron-Benjamin C.J.:
The primary object of partial suspension of sentences is deterrence. It is to hold the 
sword of Damocles over the head of the convict prisoner who has served the 
unsuspended portion, to be of good behaviour during the period of suspension. Where 
a person has served a part of his sentence in custody, he may feel that to complete the 
whole sentence would be in his interest; he would have finished paying his debt to 
society. On the other hand a first offender who has spent over a year in prison would 
have become accustomed to the place, and the suspended part of the sentence would 
hold no terrors for him. To be really effective in respect of first offenders whether old 
or young, I am of the view that that portion of the sentence to be served in custody 
should be relatively short and designed mainly to expose him to prison conditions.
The period suspended should be a longer period, so that the offender, who has tasted
39 R.v. O'Keeffe 1969 (1) All ER 426.
40 State v. Fanyane Phillimon, High Court Review Case NO. 128/1983 (Unreported).
41 See further for a different view, 1977 Criminal Law Review (Sentence) p 661 at p 670.
42 See note 41 above.
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just a bit of prison life would, if possible, weigh carefully in his mind the prospects of 
a long period under those conditions and the benefits of going straight.43
This proposition with regard to suspension of sentencing was re-affirmed in The State v 
Fanyane Phillimon44 and has since been in principle approved by the court of appeal.45 A 
long and partially suspended sentence may effectively be the worst that a young offender 
can expect on his first offence. Exceptions to this lie in murder, rape, robbery and offences 
whereof a minimum punishment is prescribed by law. Any conspiracy, incitement or attempt 
to commit any of these offences are also excluded. Beyond the realm of suspension of 
sentences is the arena whereof the recidivist is normally dealt under. I am therefore 
constrained by the delimination that appears in the opening paragraph of this paper, to 
refrain from indulging in considerations relating to the passing of a wholly effective 
sentence.
FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN PASSING SENTENCE 
First Offence
Where applicable the court should resort first to non-custodial measures outlined above. It 
has also been suggested that where young offenders who are likely to reform are concerned, 
they should be given a short, sharp shock by being sentenced to a suitable period of 
imprisonment, and the major portion of it being suspended, in effect reminding them for a 
long period of the consequences of committing further similar offences.46 It is submitted 
that this statement is equally applicable to the adult offender. That the accused has 
committed his first offence should also influence the court to suspend the sentence wholly 
depending on the circumstances of the particular case.
Guilty Plea
It is indicative of accused's wish to relieve his conscience of its burden of guilt.47 It has been 
held48 that a confession of guilt should tell in favour of an accused person. It is evidence of 
contrition, remorse and willingness to make amends.49 Provided that they are in fact guilty, 
it is in the public interest and in the interest of the smooth working of the judicial system 
that they should in fact plead guilty.50 It has been further held that it is quite proper to give 
an accused a lesser sentence where he has indicated genuine remorse by tendering such a 
plea.51 However, the fact that he pleaded not guilty should not influence the court to pass 
a harsher sentence.
Compensation (Section 304 Criminal Procedure Evidence)
In Aupa Khasu vs. The State,52 the accused had been convicted of unlawful wounding. The 
complainant had been brought before a doctor who found that he was suffering from fairly
43 Sec note 33 above.
44 State v. Fanyane Phillimon Review case No. 128/83 unreported.
45 David Pule v. The State Criminal Appeal No. 27/1984.
46 Steyn and Watton v The State, Criminal Appeal No. 294/1982 unreported.
47 The State v. Mavele Phili and another, High Court Review Case No. 355/ 1982 unreported.
48 S.w. Rahii 1981 BLR 252.
49 R. v. De Haan 1967 (3) ALL ER 618 cited in S V. Fanyane Phillimon Rer.'iew case No.128/1983.
50 See note 48 above.
51 R. v. Harper 9 68 2 QB.
52 Aupa Khasu v. The State Criminal Appeal No. 68/1984 unreported.
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severe stab wounds. On appeal against sentence, the learned judge dealing with the question 
of compensation remarked:
. . .  Nevertheless a readiness to make good any loss occasioned or to compensate for 
injury is a factor to be considered. This readiness and desire to make amends can be 
expressed without a court order being made. This attitude is one to be encouraged. If 
the accused who offers compensation and the accused who does not both receive the 
same punishment, the willingness to compensate would soon dry up. The person to 
suffer would be the complainant.53
Excessive Delay
Excessive pre-trial detention of an accused has been held to consti tu te a breach of the citizens 
rights under the constitution. Attention was drawn to such delay in The State v Masilo 
Setshago54 where the accused had been under arrest without trial on charges of using a 
bicycle without the owner's permission for more than a month. The court in that case 
proceeded to say that what is a reasonable time will turn on the circumstances of each 
particular case. The circumstances of the particular case include the complexity and 
seriousness of the matter involved, the accessibility to the place where the offence was 
committed (locus in quo), the availability of counsel, witnesses, officers of the court and 
physical evidence. The State v Makwekwe55 went further and held that excessive delay was 
a factor to be considered in the determination of sentence. It is no small matter for a man to 
live for years with a serious charge hanging over his head. It inflicted mental suffering and 
must of necessity interfere with his freedom of movement, employment opportunities and 
his social life.
Maximum Penalty
The maximum sentence is the penalty beyond which a prisoner cannot be punished. The 
maximum penalty is reserved for the most serious cases and is rarely ever imposed.56 It 
has been the practice of our courts in passing sentence to set out the maximum penalty 
which must be imposed on an offender before becoming eligible for parole or release. 
Among statutes for a minimum sentence is the Habit-Forming Drugs (Amendment) Act, 
1984.57 In Section 3 it provides:
3. (1) Except as provided by this Act, no person shall:
(a) deal in any habit-forming drug or any plant from which an habit forming 
drug can be manufactured; or
(b) possess or use any such drug or plant.
(c) Any person who contravenes subsection (1) (a), otherwise than in relation to 
dagga, shall be guilty of an offence and on conviction thereof shall be 
sentenced to all of the following punishments:
(a) imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 or more than 15 years;
(b) a fine of not less than P15 000 or in default of payment imprisonment for an 
additional term of not less than 3 or more than 5 years.
(c) corporal punishment; and notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the court
53 At p 5.
54 Appeal No. 305/1992.
55 State v. Makwekwe 1981 BLR 196.
56 Toure Cherk Mohamed v. The Stale court of appeal. Criminal Appeal No. 8/1984.
57 Habit-Forming Drugs (Amendment Act, 1984 Cap 63:04.
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shall not order that the operation of the whole or any part of the sentence be 
suspended.
Our courts treat such statutes with some measure of reluctance. When dealing with them 
they interpret them with circumspection especially when they are in conflict with the 
constitution. It was argued for example, in Desai, Modi and Others vs. The State58 that the 
above minimum punishments were inhuman and degrading and thus contrary to section 
7(1) of the Constitution of Botswana. The learned President of the Court of Appeal expressed 
his agreement with Aguda's view in S. v. Petrus59 that whilst courts may dislike mandatory 
punishments because they take away from the courts "the power to modulate punishment 
to fit the circumstances of the offender, as well as the circumstances in which the offence 
was committed", the imposition of minimum punishments by itself was not necessarily 
inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment. In spite of all this the learned President 
held that a combination of all three mandatory provisions in the Desai case was inhuman 
and degrading and thus ultra vires section 7(1) of the Constitution. The court expunged the 
corporal punishment component of the provisions; viz paragraph (c) of section 3 (2) of the 
Habit Forming Drugs Act.
CONCLUSION
Sentencing is rather complex. This paper has attempted to bring to light a rather general 
approach of sentencing tribunals in Botswana. It also brought out, although in outline, the 
purpose for which punishment is meted out. The aims of sentencing, it is submitted, provide 
criminal law as an instrument of social control with its policy basis. Now and then judges 
have repeatedly stated that an offender must not be 'visited with punishment to the point 
of being broken; that punishment should fit the criminal as well as the crime, be fair to the 
state and to the accused and be blended with a measure of mercy'.6011 is submitted therefore 
that for the aforesaid goals to be achieved, and for the accused who stands convicted on 
the dock to know what is likely to be his position after sentence has been pronounced, the 
above approach should at least be considered.
58 Desai and Modi v. The State Criminal Appeal No 9/1996 unreported.
59 S v. Petrus Criminal Appeal no. 34/1983 unreported.
60 Klass Ranthobane Masie v. The State Criminal Appeal No. 14/1982 unreported.
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